First National Bank Of Commerce v. Jeoffrey Meacham : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
First National Bank Of Commerce v. Jeoffrey Meacham : Brief of 
Appellant 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Lester A. Perry; Attorney for Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, First National Bank of Commerce v. Meacham, No. 19287 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4731 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
f 
I 
',. :.o.T IO:JAL BAllK OF 
I": 1;:1 E' 
Ill THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
·s. Case No. 19287 
TEO FF REY i !EACHAH. 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE 
L. Christensen 
IELSEI: o. SEUOR 
100 Renef icial Life Tower 
h Sc,uth State Street 
Lester A. Perry 
GREGORY S. BELL & ASSOCIATES 
376 East 400 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Lake Citv. Utah 84111 
rt,•cne:1s for. Plaintiff-Respondent 
Ff LED 
··----------------· .......... ..... S.pnm• Court, Utoh 
ltl THE SCPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,., , Io::AL BANK OF 
lj·I L t E , 
Pla1ntiff-Respond2nt, 
Jff'FfREY i !EACHAf!, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19287 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE 
·ar;ies L Chr:i.s tens en 
';:asE:J ' SEl110R 
!100 Beneficial Tower 
South Seate Street 
Lester A. Perry 
GREGORY S. BELL & ASSOCIATES 
376 East 400 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
o J '._,a k e C i t '" , lJ ta h 8 4 111 
for. Plaintiff-Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
11 I IJF Al'THORITIES iv 
.TU\EIIT 11f POINTS viii 
,,ITl.'RE OF THE CASE 1 
1 
2 
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT: 
I. DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE 7 
IS SUPERIOR TO PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 8 
AUTOMOBILE WAS UNPERFECTED AT THE TIME OF 
DEFENDANT'S PURCHASE. 
B. UNDER LAW, DEFENDANT'S INTEREST 16 
IN THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE IS SUPERIOR TO 
PLAINTIFF'S UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST. 
1. Louisiana choice of law rules direct the 17 
aptlication of Texas law which holds 
De endant's interest superior to that of 
Plaintiff's interest. 
2. Louisiana case law protects Defendant's 21 
interest in the subject automobile as a 
bona tide purchaser for value. 
C. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE FACTS OF THIS 25 
CASE SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF UTAH LAW WITH 
RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF PRIORITY. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 29 
HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT CONVERTED THE SUBJECT 
AUTOMOBILE. 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE UNAUTHORIZED ACTS 30 
OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
R. PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TO 34 
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
ii 
CONCLUSION 
Page 
1. Louisiana law controls the determination 34 
of the immediate right to possession as 
between the parties to the securitv 
agreement. 
ossession 
upon y t e 
iii 
37 
40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Allred v. Hinklev, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958) 
Amcican Budget Plan, Inc. v. Small, 229 So.2d 
190 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1969). 
American Leather Co. v. Standard Gig Saddle Co., 
9 Utah 87, 33 P. 246 (1893) 
A.rr.erican Security Bank v. Delville, 368 So.2d 167 
(La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 1979) 
Ballard v. McBryde, 275 So.2d 464 (La. Ct. App. 2d 
Cir. 1973) 
Blyth and Fargo v. Huntz, 24 Utah 62, 66 P. 611 (1901) 
Cameron Brown South, Inc., v. East Glen Oaks, Inc., 
341 So.Zd 450 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir 1916) 
Chemical Bank v. Miller Yacht Sales, 173 N.J. Super.90, 
- 413 A. Zd 619, 623 (1980) 
Chrvsler Credit v. Stout, 404 So.2d 304 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d Cir. 1 81) 
v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 
1131 (Utah 1982) 
rommercial National Bank of Shreveyort v. McWilliams, 
270 Ark. 606 s.w.za 363 (1980 
Crofoot v. Thatcher, 19 Utah 212, 57P. 171 0899) 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) 
"i7uero v. 303 So.2d 801 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
Cu. 191 ) 
irsr National Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 93 N.J. 
-:;uper-:--iso. 2h A. 2a 162 (1966) 
National Bank of v. Merchant's Mutual 
Insurance Com¥any, 8 Misc. 2d 771, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 
3Jri (1977) at 'cl 65 A.D.2d 59, 410 N.Y.S.2d 679 
(1978) --
iv 
29,30,33 
39 
36 
39 
21,23,26 
36 
38 
32 
38 
28 
24 
36 
19 
18,19 
31,32 
32,34 
Fischer v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953) 
Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 447 (1957) 
Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977) 
General Motors Accettance Cortoration v. Anzelino, 
220 La. 1019, 4 So.2d 4 7 (1953) 
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) 
Hood Motor Co., Inc. v. Lawrence, 320 So.2d 111 (La. 1975) 
In re Poteet, 5 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) 
Johnson v. Flowers, 119 Utah 425, 228 P.2d 406 (1951) 
Kaplan v. Associates Discount Corp., 253 La. 137, 217 
so.2d 177 (1968) 
Kulik v. Albers, Incorporated, 91 Nev. 134, 532 P.2d 603 
(1975) 
Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P.2d 365 (1951) 
Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 
(1968) 
McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) 
Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981) 
Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971) 
Mver v. U.S., 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981) 
Myrtle Grove Co. v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 
So.2d 305 (195 ) 
Platte Valley Bank of North Bend v. Krael,185 Neb. 168, 
114 N.W.2d 72 (1910) 
Scott Truck and Tractor ComEany v. Daniels, 401 So.2d 
590 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981) 
Tarver v. Tarver, 242 So.:d 374 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 
1970) 
v 
18' 19 
25 
29 
38 
11, 16, 
24' 29 
39 
13' 14'. 
29,39 
21 
20 
29 
29 
21, 28 
36 
29' 30' 
33,34.: 
39 
38 
39 
31 
18' 1° 
2 5' 26 
!1,,ri.ir v. McKeever, 405 So.2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 
·---r:J0 
, , v. Cook, 604 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1979) 
· 1 c:torv tJC1tional Bank of Nowata v. Stewart, 6 Kan. App. 
---xt 7. 636 p. 2d 788 <1981) 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 631 P.2d 860 
(Utah 1981) 
Walker v. Security Loan Inv. Co., 259 S.W.2d 599 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953) 
William Iselin & Co. v. & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 
2d 821, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 59 (1967) 
STATUTES 
La. Civ. Code Ann.: 
Article 10 (West Supp. 1982) 
Article 2234 (West 1952) 
Article 2242 (West 1952) 
La. Civ. Code Ann.: 
21,22 
11,16,24 
20,28 
36 
32 
31 
17 
10 
10 
Articles 2631, 2634, 2635, 2638, 2638 (West 1960) 38 
La Rev. Stat. Ann.: 
§9:5363 (West Supp. 1982) 
§9:5366 (West 1950) 
§§32:704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 710 (West 1963, 
West Supp. 1982) 
::.J. State Ann.: 
§12A:9-102(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983) 
§12A:9-103(3) (West 1962) 
Te•Jn. Code Ann. : 
§§47-9-101 (Repl. vol. 1979) 
§ § S 5 - 3 - 12 5 , 12 6 (Rep 1. vo 1. 19 8 0 ) 
Tex. Bus. and Com. Code Ann. : 
§9.102(a)(l) (Vernon 1968) 
§1.201(9), (19), (25), (44) (Vernon 1968) 
§9.30l(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983) 
i f,)rl'l Commercial Code: 
Official Com. 2, lU.L.A.35 (1976) 
vi 
37,38 
8,37 
8-13,15 
16,23,38 
31 
31 
13 
13 
20 
20 
19 
35 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, §§70-A-1-101 
(Repl. Vol. 1980): 
§l-102 
§l-105 
§9-102(2) 
§9-103(2) 
§9-30l(l)(b), (l)(c), (3) 
§9-302 
§9-311 
§9-312(5) (a) 
§9-402(9) 
§9-403 
§9-503 
Secondary Authorities 
Annotations: 
63 A.L.R. 3d 341 (1975) 
42 A.L.R. 3d 1168 (1972) 
Comment, Executory and S*ecial Proceedings: 
Executor Process,ttachment and Se uestration, 
oy. L. Rev. ( 
Prosser, Law of Torts, ch. 3, §15 (4th ed. 1971) 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971): 
§6 
§251 
§254 
'}ii 
28 
7 I / 
7 I 3 
7' 17 
28,3 
12 
33 
31 
13 
13 
30 '33' 
37 
28 
18 
39 
29 
7 '26' .:: 
36 
36 
STATEMENTS OF POINTS 
l. DEFEl'lDANT' S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE 
IS SUPERIOR TO PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
AUTOMOBILE WAS UNPERFECTED AT THE TIME OF 
DEFENDANT'S PURCHASE. 
B. CNDER LOUISIANA LAW, DEFENDANT'S INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE IS SUPERIOR TO 
PLAINTIFF'S UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST. 
1. Louisiana choice of law rules direct the 
aptlication of Texas law which holds 
De endant's interest superior to that of 
Plaintiff's interest. 
2. Louisiana case law protects Defendant's 
interest in the sub'ect automobile as a 
e pure aser or va ue. 
C. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF UTAH LAW WITH 
RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF PRIORITY. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT CONVERTED THE SUBJECT 
AUTOMOBILE. 
A. DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE UNAUTHORIZED ACTS 
OF POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
B. PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
1. Louisiana law controls the determination 
ot the immediate ri ht to ossession as 
etween t e parties to t e security 
agreement. 
2. Louisiana law does not ive a secured 
ere itor an imme iate ri t to ossession 
ot t e co atera upon e au t y t e 
debtor. 
viii 
IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF l'TAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF 
COMMERCE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
JEOFFREY MEACHAM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19287 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an action for replevin. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This action for replevin was brought by Plaintiff, a 
secured party, alleging an interest in the subject automobile 
superior to that of Defendant, a subsequent purchaser for value. 
The District Court found that Plaintiff's security 
interest was unperfected at the time of Defendant's purchase. The 
Court also felt that since Defendant failed to ascertain if any 
liens were outstanding on the subject automobile, he was not a 
bona fide purchaser for value under Louisiana law. 
Defendant was found to have converted the subject 
automobile under Utah law because Plaintiff had an immediate right 
to possession of the vehicle upon default in the underlving 
security agreement. Therefore, any transfer amounted to 
conversion. The Court felt this was true whether Defendant •;1as a 
bona fide purchaser for value or not. 
Summary judgment as to possession of the automobile 
"'r,ted in favor of Plaintiff with the issue of damages being 
,,,[ :·ur future determination. 
RELIEF SOUTHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, JEOFFREY A. MEACHAM, respectfully requests 
·Lis Court to reverse the judgment of the trial court as a matter 
,1 law or, in the alternative, remand the case for a determination 
the genuine issues of material fact existing in the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime prior to the spring of 1980, Richard and 
Shawn Carey, who are not parties to this action, purchased a 1978 
Ferrari GTS automobile, serial number 26897. (R.291 Meacham 
8eposition, p.9.) This automobile is the subject of this action. 
lln January 12, 1981, the Careys borrowed money from the 
Plaintiff/Respondent, FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE (hereinafter 
c-eferred to as "Plaintiff"). Its principal place of business is 
in the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. (R.166.) 
The Careys granted a chattel mortgage in the subject automobile in 
of Plaintiff to secure the loan amount. A certificate of 
itle was issued covering the automobile by the State of Louisiana 
'<1 Apri 1 16, 1981 showing the Careys as owners and Plaintiff as 
the first lienholder as of January 12, 1981. 
i-n-l7ll. 
(R.93-94, 
The Careys sold the subject Ferrari for $36, 000 to 
· - 1°r F. Amann, Jr., purportedly on March 11, 1981. Plaintiff 
·"" 1 i r o.ted this purchase by loaning Amann $25, 000. On the sale 
2 
date, Amann executed a Promissory Note obligating him to pay the 
principal plus interest, and a chattel mortgage in the automobi:e 
in favor of Plaintiff. <R.84-87, 96, 172-173, 177.) Plaintift 
by Affidavit, states that Amann made his first scheduled 
on or about April 27, 1981, and he has failed to make any further 
payments under the note. (R.161,167.) As a condition of the sale 
of the subject automobile to Amann, Plaintiff released its lien 
exhibited on the Carey's Certificate of Title. (R.94, 171.) This 
release was apparently effective on the date of the sale to Amann, 
March 11, 1981. 
On or about May 27, 1981, Plaintiff attempted to 
perfect its security interest in the subject automobile relative 
to the Amann loan by submitting an application for Certificate of 
Title with the required documents and fees to the Louisiana 
DepartUlent of Public Safety. (R.167, 174.) The Department of 
Public Safety returned the above-mentioned documents and, in a 
letter dated June 10, 1981, made additional requests of Plaintiff, 
including that the Carey's title be endorsed by them and the 
additional fee of $2,853.40 be submitted. (R.179.) The date 
which the application for Certificate of Title was again delivered 
to the Department of Safety has not been established. The 
Louisiana Certificate of Title covering the Ferrari was issued in 
Amann' s name on September 8, 1981, showing Plaintiff as first 
lienholder. 
In or about June, 1981, Defendant/Appellant, JEOFFRE\ 
A. MEACHAM (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant") and Richard 
Carey discussed the possible purchase of the subject automobile b" 
- 3 -
The agreed purchase price was $5, 000 cash and 7, 000 
,,es of U.S. Rich Hill Minerals Corporation (now T.D.Two, Ltd.) 
which was trading at between $5. 00 and $5. 50 per share. 
'ii, Meacham Deposition, pp.10, 15.) In that same month, Carey 
:·•Livered the subject automobile to Defendant in Oklahoma City, 
nk,ahoma. Accompanying the car was a registration card issued by 
lhe State of Louisiana, showing Shawn Carey as the registered 
owner, with no Certificate of Title having been proffered by 
Carey. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, pp.10-11.) At that time, 
Carey represented that no liens existed on the automobile and that 
he would give Defendant the title upon Carey's return to his home 
in Houston, Texas. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, p.16.) Defendant 
no knowledge of Amann' s ownership interest or of Plaintiff's 
security interest in the subject automobile. Since Carey did not 
want to take the car with him, he left it in Defendant's 
possession. Defendant then caused the Ferrari to be driven to 
Salt Lake City, where he added necessary improvements to the car 
costing $2,300. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, pp.17,50-52.) 
Defendant subsequently wired $5,000 to Carey in 
tiouston, Texas, and placed the shares of U.S. Rich Hill Minerals 
stock with a transfer agent. (R.291, Meacham 
De;iosition, pp.12-14, 21-22.) 
During the month of July, 1981, Defendant was 
•·ntacted by both Plaintiff and Amann concerning the status of the 
: 1 1IJ]ecc clUtomobile. Amann stated that the car belonged to him and 
1:h3t Plaintiff had a lien on it. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, 
')f) f:i - 7 . ) Defendant then contacted Carey who admitted having 
- 4 -
previously sold the Ferrari to Amann. Carey also stated that he 
had given the $5,000 to Amann, which Amann later confirmed. 
(R. 291, Meacham Deposition, pp. 9, 23.) Having learned this, 
Defendant told Amann that if $7,300 (representing $5,000 given for 
the purchase and $2, 300 in necessary improvements) were to be 
forwarded to Defendant, he would have the car delivered to Amann 
at his home in Houston, Texas. (R. 291, Meacham Deposition, p. 23.) 
Amann agreed to return $5, 000, but refused to pay for the 
improvements. In or about August of 1981, Amann arrived in Salt 
Lake City with Mavis Bond Montecino, his alleged fiancee. At that 
time, Montecino gave Defendant a $5, 000 check drawn on a Houston 
bank for the return of the subject automobile. Defendant inquired 
as to the sufficiency of funds in the account on which the check 
drawn, the Houston bank responding that it was a new account with 
an approximate balance of $50. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, 
pp.23-25, Exhibit A.) When confronted with this fact, Amann 
stated that the funds would be transferred. The funds were not 
transferred, and Amann and Montecino left Salt Lake City. The 
Defendant has had no further contact with them. (R. 291, Meacham 
Deposition, pp.25-26.) 
Dan Ross, Plaintiff's agent, also contacted Defendant 
in or about July, 1981. Defendant informed Ross, as he had Amann, 
that he (Defendant) had expended $7,300 on the Ferrari and, if 
that amount was tendered, he would deliver the automobile to 
Plaintiff. After further discussion, however, it was agreed that 
if Plaintiff could furnish clear title, Defendant would pa:i 
$21, 000 (represented by Ross as being the payoff of Plaintiff's 
- 5 -
_Jc n ! for the automobile. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, pp.27-30.) 
1Jn Jul:; 1981, a customer's draft was presented for payment in 
"r ,,f Plaintiff at Defendant's bank in the amount of 
(R.98.) Various documents were also presented. The 
of Title was, however, not included. Because of this, 
Oef endant instructed his bank to return the documents and 
terminated any further communication with Ross. (R. 291, Meacham 
Deposition, pp. 30-31.) 
During this period, Defendant contacted the Louisiana 
:Jepartment of Public Safety, whose records reflected that the 
Careys were owners of the subject vehicle. 
Deposition, p.37.) 
(R.291, Meacham 
Later, John Pitts, Plaintiff's Vice President, 
contacted Defendant. Again, a deal was struck whereby Plaintiff 
was to furnish clear title in return for Defendant's payment of 
$21,000. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, pp.29, 35-40.) A customer's 
draft, dated October 1, 1981, was presented at Defendant's bank in 
ravor of Plaintiff in the amount of $26,314.83. (R. 97.) A 
letter, dated November 30, 1981, to Defendant from Pitts, also 
referred to an amount of $26,314.83. (R.101-102.) Having 
previously agreed to a price of $21,000, not $26,314.83, Defendant 
felt Plaintiff had again taken advantage of him, and had no 
cunher C<)rnmunications with representatives of Plaintiff. The 
"resPnt action ensued. Pursuant to stipulation, the subject 
;;ut 11rnnbi le has been delivered to the custody of the Salt Lake 
uutv Constable pending outcome of ths action. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN THE SCBJECT AUTOMOBILE 
IS SUPERIOR TO PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST 
In approaching a choice of law problem, a statutor· 
directive of the forum court's state is first followed ii 
approaching a choice of law issue. Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws §6(1)(1971). Since, the issues on appeal revolve 
around a security interest created by a chattel mortgage, the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code is the controlling forum statute. Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-9-102(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
In determining the relative priorities of the 
parties, perfection or nonperfection of Plaintiff's security 
interest is the controlling issue. Therefore, the Code's general 
choice of law provision is applicable. It provides that §9-103 
governs issues of perfection of a security interest. Utah Code 
Ann. §70A-l-105(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980). §9-103(2) provides, in 
part, that: 
(a) This subsection applies to goods covered by a 
certificate of title issued under a statute of this 
state or of another jurisdiction under the law of which 
indication of a security interest on the certificate is 
required as a condition of perfection. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
perfection and the effect of perfection or 
non-perfection of a security interest are governed by 
the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the 
jurisdiction issuing the certificate .... 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
The subject automobile is covered bv a certificate o· 
title issued pursuant to statutes of Louisiana undf'r whic' 
incication of a security interest thereon is a condition o: 
perfection. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. et (West 1963)' 
Louisiana law. therefore, governs the issi.:e ,,f perfection. 
- 7 -
PLA It!TIFF' S SECURITY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE WAS 
UNPERFECTED AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT'S PURCHASE. 
Louisiana's Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, La. 
::i,.1t. Ann. §§32:701 et (West 1963), is the sole and 
., method of executing and recording chattel mortgages and 
"'wern,; the priorities of such mortgages on motor vehicles. La. 
Re•:. Stat. Ann. §9:5366 (West 1950); §32:710 (West Supp. 1982). A 
brief discussion of this law follows. All references are to 
Chapter Four of Title 32 of the Louisiana Revised Statute of 1950, 
as amended. (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§32:701 
Chapter Four applies to the sale and mortgaging of 
vehicles of the sort and kind required to be licensed in Louisiana 
)104. Since it was contemplated that the subject automobile would 
be registered and licensed in Louisiana, the chattel mortgage 
]etween Amann and Plaintiff is subject to the provisions of 
Chapter Four. §705 requires the seller of a vehicle to deliver a 
certificate of title issued under Chapter Four with a signed 
eCJdorsernent of sale and assignment to the purchaser. §706 states 
that no person buying a vehicle shall receive marketable title 
a certificate of title to said vehicle is obtained; 
provided, however, that the negotiation of a chattel mortgage on a 
1ehicl<= will not be delayed by this provision. §706 further 
r"1ides that a chattel mortgage shall be effective as to all 
,1ersons from the time of its execution if the mortgage is received 
'Del •:;iJ idated by the vehicle commission (hereafter "commissioner") 
1°hin :'"ifteen (15) days after such date of execution; otherwise, 
-im date of notation of the chattel mortgage on the face of 
cer:ificate of title. Applications for certificates of title 
- 8 -
are to be by prescribed form, sworn tiefc·re a notar:1 public withi, 
five (5) days after delivery of such vehicle :md accompanied b·: 
the prescribed fee. If a certificate of title has been previous] 
issued for the vehicle, said certific:lte, duly endorsed, shol' 
accompany the application §707. If satisfied that the applicac· 
is the OwTler of the vehicle and the application is in proper fonr., 
the commissioner shall issue a certificate of title. but not 
otherwise §707. \Jhen a lien is shown on the certificate. it shall 
be forwarded by the commissioner to the mortgagee of first rani< 
for retention until its mortgage is satisfied § 708. Upon full 
liquidation of the mortgage, the first mortgagee shall deliver the 
title with proper release of said mortgage to the registerec 
owner, or next ranking mortgage holder. The owner or chattel 
mortgage holder may present the 
for cancellation of the mortgage 
certificate to the commissioner 
§708. Every chattel mortgage 
subject to Chapter Four shall be in writing describing the nature 
of the obligation secured thereby and the mortgaged vehicle §710. 
In order to affect third persons, the chattel mortgage must be by 
authentic act or by private act duly authenticated, and is 
effective against third persons as of the time of its execution if 
received and validated by the COIT.missioner's office within 
(15) days after such execution. Otherwise, the chattel mortgage 
is effective as to all persons when it is delivered to the 
commissioner §710. 
The above-described steps 'or rer!:ection make 
clear that Plaintiff's interest was unperfccted whr 
Defendant purchased the su'ojec .. .1 u t '.:lmo bi e . At the 
- q -
.• G noted that the application was not received and 
i! 1•L,red «vithin fifteen (15) days of the execution of the chattel 
, rr .. 1,cl between Plaintiff and Amann. Therefore, the mortgage did 
,ffect third persons from the date of said execution, 
rt e .J b March 11 , 1981 . c . f . § § 7 O 6 , 71 O . 
The record shows that §707 was not followed in that 
.. c certificate of title previously issued to the Careys was not 
.;u1'.· endorsed by them. Furthermore, the Careys' title had not 
returned to the commissioner's office for cancellation as of 
:.c··iember 5, 1982. (R.179, 205.) c.f. §§705,707. 
There are, at the very least, issues of material fact 
c.i be resolved as to whether the Amann chattel mortgage was duly 
d'c:t-.enticated, and the application for certificate of title was 
:or·1pe<:1 sworn before a notary. c.f. §§707,710.These issues arise 
)ecause of the past practices of Plaintiff's in-house notary, 
J. Pisano. Articles 2234 of Louisiana's Civil Code 
control authentic acts. They provide in substance that authentic 
aces must be executed before a notary or, if under private 
''"'"1cure, acknowledged by the party against whom it is adduced. 
!..a. Civil Code Ann. art. 's 2234, 2242 (West 1952). It is 
ibvious from the record that Pisano' s siganture attesting the 
:c;re:1s' endorsement on March 11, 1981 conflicts with the 
c,1ar<:;:ient of Public Safety's letter of June 10, 1981 rejecting 
.\mJnr1's ;ipplication. The letter states that the Careys' title had 
ueen endorsed. (R.93-94, 170-171, 179.) Certainly, the 
·r ' could not have executed their signatures nor acknowledged 
.,,. 'ar;,e before Pisano on March 11, 1981, as he so attests. 
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Indeed, John Pitts, Plaintiff's Vice President, confirms in a 
letter to Defendant, dated November JO, 1981, th<:!t title had not 
been properly transferred from the Carevs tn Amann as of July 20, 
1981. (R.101-102.) The customer's draft referred to in the Pitts 
letter is dated July 20, 1981. <R. 98.) 
These actions throw in doubt the whole evidentiar:1 
chain of events in which Pisano is the notary. For example, was 
the Bill of Sale between Amann and the Careys, attested by Pisano, 
actually executed on March 11, 1981 (R.96, 177), or was the sale 
executed after 
Furthermore, was 
Defendant purchased the 
the Amann chattel mortgage 
subject automobile' 
(R.85, 172) properly 
attested by Pisano so as to meet a condition of perfection, c.f. 
§ 710? Viewed in a light most favorable to Defendant, Pisano's 
past practices give rise to material isues of fact that cannot be 
answered by the documents themselves, and which are best resolved 
by the trier of fact and not by summary judgment. Hall v. Warren, 
632 P.2d 348 (Utah 1981); Thorncock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1979); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Assuming arguendo, however, that both the sale 
between Amann and Carey and the Amann chattel mortgage were 
properly executed on March 11, 1981, Plaintiff's security interest 
was still unperfected because of its failure to properly "deliver" 
the application to the commissioner as required by § 710B before 
the date of Defendant's purchase. c.f.§710B. (The exact date of 
Defendant's purchase has yet to be established. Defendant recalls 
it to be near the end of June, 1981, and no later than July 4, 
1981 (R.291, Meacham Deposition, p.15). h·: 
l -
_, 1t_._c:; that Carey took possession of the car on June 22, 1981 
Ip. Lh 2) . ) 
Plaintiff contends that the Amann application for 
, 11 ificate of Title was delivered to the commissioner as early as 
•v '7, 1981, and no later than June 10, 1981. (R.llO.) This 
q.pLication originally submitted May 27, 1981 (R.174) was returned 
l·• Pla.intiff by the commissioner with a letter dated June 10, 1981 
and a further notation of June 22, 1981 on the same letter 
iR.179). There is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff 
resubmitted the application prior to Defendant's purchase of the 
subject automobile. As noted supra, delivery of a chattel 
mortgage (included in the app lica ti on) to the commissioner is a 
c0ndition of perfection §710B. 
Even if the chattel mortgage was delivered prior to 
Defendant's purchase, Plaintiff's security interest was still not 
perfected at that time. "Delivery" as used in §710B should be 
construed as meaning the application is delivered in proper form 
and is approved by the commissioner. 
Although there is no Louisiana case law on this 
point, the filing provisions of Article 9 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code provides a useful analogy. Filing of a financing 
statement is the method by which most security interests are 
perfected under the Code. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-302 (Repl. Vol. 
, . Statutes which provide for indication of a security 
on certificates of title are, of course, excepted. id. 
ri.\-9-J0:(3) (b). "A financing statement substantially complying 
_•li the [ fil:'..ng provisions] is effective even though it contains 
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minor errors which are not seriously misleading." id. §9-402(9). 
Thus, under the Code, a financing statement presented for filing 
which is substantially correct and not seriously misleading 
perfects the security interest. id. §9-403(1). Delivery of the 
application for certificate of title under La. Rev. Stat. Ann 
§32:710B (West Supp. 1982) could, by analogy, be said to perfect 
the security interest if done so in the proper form which is 
substantially correct and not seriously misleading. 
A well-reasoned opinion discussing this analogy with 
respect to certificate of title applications is In re Poteet, 5 
Bankr. 631 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). In In re Poteet, the court 
was faced with the issue of whether a bank's retention of a 
security interest in an automobile constituted a preference under 
11 U.S. C. § 54 7 (b) (Supp. 1980) ; the court thus having to determine 
the date on which the bank perfected its security interest. The 
applicable statute provided that constructive notice of a lien 
relates from the time of receipt and filing a request for notation 
of the lien upon the certificate of title. Tenn. Code Ann. 
§§55-3-125,-126 (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
In Poteet, an application for certificate of title in 
the debtor's name with the bank's 1 ien noted thereon was made 
outside the preference period. This application was rejected by 
the Tennesee Motor Vehicle Department. The resubmitted 
application was subsequently approved upon receipt of requested 
documents within the preference period. 5 Bankr. at 633. The 
Court held that, by analogy to the filing provisions of Article 0 
of the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code, Tenn. Code Ann. 
- 13 -
'\, (Repl. Vol. 1979), the first application did not 
;icrfc< c the bank's security interest, perfection occurring only 
en i was submitted in proper f orrn and approved by the Motor 
,, Lepartment. The security interest, therefore, constituted 
1,,e[eccnce. 5 Bankr. at 636. 
En route to its holding, the court in Poteet noted 
that, under Tennesee law, a certificate of title will issue only 
if the Motor Vehicle Department is satisfied that the applicant is 
the owner of the vehicle and any lien that is noted is proved. 5 
Bankr. at 634. The court also expressed concern that constructive 
notice of a lien is given only when an application is accepted. 
Otherwise, "[t]here [is] no proof that when an application is 
rejected notice will somehow be given of security interests that 
were to be noted on the certificate." 5 Bankr. at 635. 
In the case at bar, the initial Amann application for 
certificate of title was rejected and returned to Plaintiff 
hecause the Careys' title had not been duly endorsed (R.179). 
Furthermore, the Carey title had not been returned to the 
Louisiana Department of Public Safety as of November 5, 1982 
IR 179, 205). (It is not clear why Amann' s certificate was in 
iact issued on Septermber 8, 1981 showing Plaintiff's lien 
:he:-eon. It is clear, however, that Plaintiff's lien was 
'considered unperfected by the Department as of November 5, 1982 
•R.205)). The Amann application was, therefore, misleading in 
-hat the old Carey title, if not duly endorsed and presented for 
anceellation, could mislead third persons as to the ownership of 
cc- •:ehicle. since, the application was rejected, there 
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is no guarantee that notice of Plaintiff's security interest would 
somehow be given to Defendant. Indeed, when Defendant inquired, 
the records showed Carey as the owner of the subject automobile. 
(R.291, Meacham Deposition, p.37.) Finally, like the Tennessee 
statute in In re Poteet, supra, §32:707G of the Louisiana Revised 
Statutes states that certificate of title will issue only if the 
commissioner is satisfied that the applicant is the owner of the 
vehicle and the application is in proper form, but not otherwise. 
The corrrrnissioner was obviously not satisfied as to the ownership 
of the subject vehicle where the Carey certificate was not duly 
endorsed. Plaintiff's own Vice President, John Pitts, admitted to 
Defendant that this had not been accomplished as of July 20, 1981. 
(R.101-102, 98.) Therefore, in order to effectively give notice 
to third persons, "delivery" as used in § 32: 710B of the Louisiana 
Revised Statute, requires an application for certificate of title 
to be made in proper form and be accepted by the commissioner's 
office. This was not done prior to Defendant's purchase of the 
subject automobile and, therefore, Plaintiff was unperfected at 
this time. 
There is another issue of material fact that, if 
resolved against Plaintiff, would also leave it unperfected. As 
discussed supra at 10, the record discloses that the Careys did 
not endorse the certificate of title issued in their names on 
March 11, 1981 as Charles J. Pisano, Plaintiff's in-house notary, 
so attests. In fact, it would have been a physical impossibilit'i 
since the Carey title was not issued until April 16, 1981. 
(R.93-94, 170-171.) It may, therefore, be questioned whether anv 
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the documents attested by Pisano were, in fact, properly 
. ,,.cured as required by law. See La. Civil Code Ann. art's 2234 
(West 1952.) Perfection under Louisiana's Vehicle 
tificate of Title Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32:710B (West Supp. 
:"82!, requires the chattel mortgage be by authentic act or by 
1
>ri··;ate act duly authenticated in any manner provided by law. 
Gi•.'en his actions, Pisano' s attestation of the Amann chattel 
(R. 85, 172) creates an inference that that mortgage is 
likewise defective. 
The foregoing suggests that, and the District Court 
so found (R.241), Plaintiff was unperfected at the time of 
Defendant's purchase as a matter of law. At the very least, 
inferences are raised concerning the date which Plaintiff 
Gelivered the second Amann application to the commissioner and the 
effectiveness of Pisano's attestation of the Amann chattel 
mortgage, so as to give rise to material issues of fact required 
:o be resolved by the trier of fact. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 
iCtah 1981); Thorncock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Utah 
i\.Civ.P. 56(c). 
Plaintiff thus having been established as unperfected 
:t the time of Defendant's purchase, the next step is to determine 
:he ?arties' relative priorities with respect to the subject 
·errari. 
E. UNDER LOUISIANA LAW, DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT 
d!'l'ot!OB ILE IS SUPERIOR TO PLAINTIFF'S UNPERFECTED SECURITY 
INTEREST. 
As noted supra at 7, the controlling statutory 
:.cective with respect to the issue of perfection of Plaintiff's 
- 16 -
security interest points to the application of Louisiana law. 
Utah Code Ann. §§70A-l-105(2), 9-103(::') (Repl. Vol. 1980)' 
§9-103(2) provides, in part, that "perfection and the effect of 
perfection or nonperfection of the security interest [in goods 
covered by certificate of title legislation] are governed by the 
law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction 
issuing the certificate ... " Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-103(2) (Repl. 
Vol. 1980). Since the subject automobile was covered by 
Louisiana's Certificate of Title Law which requires notation on 
the certificate as a condition of perfection, §9-103(2) thus 
points to Louisiana law (including its conflict of laws rules) to 
resolve issues of perfection and the effects of perfection or 
nonperfection. 
1. Louisiana 
aw w ic 
of law rules direct the a lication of Texas 
s eren ant s interest superior to t at o 
Plaintiff's interest. 
Louisiana's general statutory choice of law provision 
provides, in part, that: 
The form and effect of public and private written 
instruments are governed by the laws and usages of the 
places where they are passed or executed. 
But the effect of acts in one (state] to have effect in 
another (state], is regulated by the laws of the country 
where such acts are to have effect. 
La. Civil Code Ann. art. 10 (West Supp. 1982). 
With respect to priorities involving securitv 
interests, this provision has been held to mean that the validit; 
of a foreign security interest against subsequent purchasers 
creditors is determined by the law where the propertv was located 
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"', •'ce security interest attached. If entitled to priority in 
, ':L ;,,rci>;n state, the security interest will be recognized in 
,»1ts1ana if the collateral is removed to Louisiana without the 
, i ed",t: or consent of the secured creditor, However, if the 
, µ1r!; is removed with the knowledge and consent of the secured 
priority is determined by the law of the state to which 
·he i'roperty is removed. See v. Bullington, 223 La, 
368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953); Scott Truck and Tractor Company v. 
Daniels, 401 So.2d 590 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981). See generally 
,;,nnor, 42 A.L.R. 3d 1168, 1186, 1195 (1972) and cases cited 
cherein. In addition, Louisiana courts will also apply the law of 
the state to which the property is removed where the secured 
aeditor, with due diligence, would have discovered the removal. 
is a factual issue to be determined by the trier of 
0 act . Figuera v. Figuera, 303 So.2d 801 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
19 7 ' 
The record discloses that Plaintiff consented or 
>,;-:ew, or with due diligence should have known, of Amann's removal 
,f che subject automobile to Houston, Texas. The removal was not 
or inadvertent . Plaintiff's own records reflect that 
. :.X:am: lived and conducted business in Houston, Texas (R.82). 
when Amann and his fiancee came to Salt Lake City 
eeking the return of the subject automobile, the "bad" check 
.. bv his fiancee was drawn on a Houston bank and showed the 
Houston address as Plaintiff's records. (R. 291, Meacham 
Exh. A.) Defendant was also under the impression that 
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both Amann and Carey maintained their residences in Houston. :n 
(R.291, Meacham Deposition, pp.9,16,23,25.) 
Thus, Plaintiff having known and consented to Arnann's 
removal of the subject automobile to Texas, it should have beer 
aware of the possible application of Texas law. Therefore, 
iJc 
Louisiana choice of law rules correctly mandate the application of :<r 
Texas law with respect to the issue of priority. Fischer v. 5 ' 
Bullington, supra; Scott Truck and Tractor Company v. Daniels, 
supra. At the minimum, there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Plaintiff should have known of such a removal 
by the exercise of due diligence. Figuero v. Figuero, supra. 
This question cannot be resolved on summary judgment and should be 
remanded for determination. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1977); Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
Texas law, under its version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Tex. Bus. and Com. Code Ann. §§1.101 et 
(Vernon 1968)' grants Defendant priority over Plaintiff's 
unperfected security interest. In particular, Defendant is 
entitled to priority by virtue of §9.30l(a) (3), which states: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (b), an 
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the 
rights of ... (3) in the case of goods, ... a person who 
is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk 
or other buyer in not the ordinary course of 
business ... to the extent he gives value and receives 
delivery of the collateral before it is perfected. 
Tex. Bus. and Com. Code Ann. §9.30l(a) (3) (Vernon Supp. 1983). 
Defendant is not a secured party. The tro.nsaction 
between Defendant and Carey was clearly a sale which was not 
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,,,. 2nded to create a security interest. c.f. §9.102(a)(l). 
,Jc.-cndant is also not a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
( 9) defines that term as "a person who in good faith and 
1 , l,out knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the 
,cr,crship rights or security interest of a third party in the 
buys in the ordinary course from a person in the business of 
selling goods of that kind ... " It is undisputed that neither 
C:irey nor Amann are in the business of selling automobiles, or 
th;it Defendant acted otherwise than in good faith or honesty. 
§1.201(19).Defendant gave value for the subject automobile, 
in that any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract 
is "value." §1.201(44). Defendant gave $S,000 cash and tendered 
7,000 shares of U.S. Rich Hill Minerals Corporation stock, which 
,0as trading between $S.OO and SS.SO per share. (R.291, Meacham 
Deposition, pp.10,lS.) 
Defendant took delivery of the subject automobile 
before Plaintiff's security interest was perfected (see supra at 
0), "Knowledge" of a fact is when a person has actual knowledge of 
lt, §1. 201 ( 2S). There is no evidence in the record which would 
oJggest Defendant had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's security 
:nterest. Moreover, Plaintiff, as a secured creditor, has the 
burden of proving Defendant's knowledge. Kulik v. Albers, 
:ncornorated, 91 Nev. 134, S32 P.2d 603 (197S); Levine v. Pascal, 
App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 42S (1968). 
Plaintiff's unperfected security interest is, 
herelnre, subordinate to Defendant's interest. See Victory 
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National Bank of Nowata v. Stewart, 6 Kan. App. 847, 636 P.2d 788 
(1981); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
2. Louisiana case law rotects Defendant's interest in the 
su ject automo i e as ona i e pure aser or va ue. 
In the alternative, assuming the discussion above l' 
resolved against Defendant and Louisiana law is found to be 
controlling as to priority, Louisiana cases clearly protect 
Defendant as a bona fide purchaser for value Cbfp). In finding 
that Defendant was not a bfp under Louisiana law, the District 
Court quotes from Ballard v. McBryde, 275 So.2d 464 (La. Ct. App. 
2d Cir. 1973): 
We are of the opinion the Vehicle Certificate of Title 
Law is designed to afford the public a means of proper 
determination of ownership and encumbrance of vehicles 
subject thereto and to protect innocent purchasers who 
have relied thereon. 
id. at 467 (R. 239). 
The District Court further states that Louisiana law 
requires a purchaser to protect himself by ascertaining who holds 
title to the vehicle and if any liens are outstanding. Kaplan v. 
Associates Discount Corp., 253 La. 137, 217 So.2d 177 (1968); 
Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So.2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981); 
Ballard v. McBryde, supra. (R. 240.) In the absence of actual 
notice of an adverse interest in the vehicle, a fair reading of 
the above-cited cases does not require a purchaser to inquire as 
to potential liens beyond a search of the public records. The 
Vehicle Certificate of Title Law protects those "who have relied 
thereon." Ballard v. McBrvde, supra. 
Contrary to the District Court's finding CR. 239), 
Defendant did in fact rely on Louisiana public records. 
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!K.101-102, 291, Meacham Deposition, p.37.) The search showed 
r:cnev as the record owner of the subject Ferrari. (R.203-204, 291 
horn Deposition, P. 3 7. ) While Defendant did not inquire of the 
lie records when the car was delivered in Oklahoma City, he did 
;o only two to three weeks later when notified of a possible 
The fact that Defendant searched the records only after 
he took possession of the automobile does not defeat his status as 
a bfp. 
Consideration of the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction which brought the subject automobile into Defendant's 
possession is appropriate. Theriac v. McKeever, supra, 405 So.2d 
354, 357. Defendant had seen the Ferrari in Carey's possession 
more than one year earlier, at which time Carey represented that 
it was a wedding gift from his new bride. (R.291, Meacham 
Deposition, p.9.) 
found within the 
cegistered owner. 
Upon delivery the registration certificate 
subject vehicle showed Shawn Carey as the 
(R.291, Meacham Deposition, 10-11, 16-17.) 
Also, at the time of delivery, 
consideration because the title 
Defendant 
was not 
did not tender 
then delivered. 
Subsequently, however, and prior to his knowledge of Plaintiff's 
security interest, Defendant gave value in the form of cash and 
shdres of stock. (R.291, Meacham Deposition, 15, 17, 50-52.) 
Gi"Jen the above circumstances, it cannot be said that Defendant 
,cted unreasonably in relying on the Careys' appearance as owners 
' the subject vehicle which was also reflected in the public 
of Louisiana. Thus, Defendant is an innocent purchaser 
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for value, as defined by Louisiana law. Bal lard v. McBrvde, 
supra. 
The argument that if Carey was shown as record owner, 
Plaintiff's security interest would also be reflected as evidencec 
by the certificate of title issued to Carey on April 16, 1981, 
cannot be resolved on the record before the Court. Louisiana 
provides that upon satisfaction of a chattel mortgage on a motor 
vehicle, the chattel mortgagee shall deliver the title with proper 
release thereon to the registered owner. And, upon final 
discharge of a chattel mortgage, the owner, or chattel mortgagee, 
may request the cancellation of the oortgage from the public 
records. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32:708 (West Supp. 1982.) The 
record shows that Plaintiff's lien has been noted as satisfied on 
the Carey title, the date, if any, being illegible. (R. 93-94, 
170, 171.) It is not clear, however, whether the title was not 
returned to Carey and he in turn caused Plaintiff's lien to be 
stricken from the public records. It is also possible that the 
lien was erased from the public records when the first Amann 
application for certificate of title was delivered to the 
Louisiana Department of Public Safety on May 27, 1981. (R. 16 7, 
174.) Furthermore, the Department of Public Safety had not 
received the Carey title for cancellation as of November 5, 198: 
(R. 205). The above, when considered with the fact that the Carev 
title had not been properly transferred to Amann at the time of 
Defendant's purchase (see supra at 10, 11), raises an inference o' 
fact which cannot be properl? resolved in a motion for summar 
,,1dgment. Hall v. Warren, 632 P. 2d 848 (Utah 1981); Thorncock v. 
1nnk, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). 
The District Court further held that Plaintiff's 
-e111r1tv interest was maintained as long as it retained possession 
1 rhe title to the subject automobile. Commercial National Bank 
1Jt Shreveport v. McWilliams, 270 Ark. 606 S.W.2d 363 (1980) 
lappl ying Louisiana law). (R. 240.) Aside from its suspect 
precedential value, the Arkansas court cited no Louisiana case nor 
has it been subsequently relied upon by a Louisiana court, 
McWilliams is distinguishable. In McWilliams, the bank had taken 
all the necessary steps to perfect its security interest under 
Louisiana law, and thereafter retained the issued certificate of 
title in the secured vehicle. An Arkansas purchaser of the 
vehicle requested a certificate of title from Louisiana 
authorities who erroneously issued a certificate not showing the 
bank's lien noted thereon. 606 S.W.2d at 363-364. The Arkansas 
court held that as long as the bank retained the certificate of 
title, it maintained its security interest which was superior to 
the Arkansas purchaser. id. at 364-365. 
The case at bar differs in that Plaintiff had not 
nrnperly perfected its security interest at the time of 
Defendant's purchase. (See supra at 8) Moreover, Plaintiff did 
.10t even have possession of the Amann title until September 8, 
:Y81. CR. 168, 180-181.) If Plaintiff relies on its possession 
•f the Carey title, it is not clear, as discussed supra, that 
11intiff did, in fact, retain possession of that title. In any 
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event, Plaintiff's lien was shown as satisfied on the Carey title, 
the date, if any, being illegible. (R. 94, 171.) 
In finding that Defendant was not a bona fide 
purchaser under Louisiana law, the District Court also referred tc 
the maxim that where one of two innocent purchasers must suffer 2 
loss, it must be borne by the one whose conduct rendered the 
injury possible. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 447 
(1957) (R. 240). Plaintiff certainly cannot be considered innocent 
since it created much of the initial confusion by not acting 
expeditiously in perfecting its security. Actions by Plaintiff's 
agents also contributed to this matter not being settled 
extrajudicially (R. 101-102, 291 Meacham Deposition, pp. 30-32, 
39-41). It is also factually unfounded that Defendant paid his 
money and took his chances (R. 241). As discussed supra at 22, 
Defendant relied not only upon the reasonable appearances as to 
the state of the title of the subject vehicle, but also upon 
Louisiana public records which showed Defendant's vendor as the 
record owner CR. 203-204, 291 Meacham Deposition, p. 37). 
Plaintiff's actions, of failing to properly perfect its security 
interest, rendered the injury possible. Therefore, Plaintiff must 
bear the resultant loss. 
Finally, the Louisiana Court of Appeals has 
recognized the right of a third party to retain possession of an 
automobile when the public records reflected ownership in her 
vendor. Tarver v. Tarver, 242 So.2d 374, 377 (La. Ct. App. 2c' 
Cir. 1970). In the instant case, the public records reflected 
- -
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in Defendant's vendor, Carey. (R. 101-102, 291, Meacham 
',, o'.;ition, p. 37.) 
Defendant, having thus relied on the Louisiana public 
,,r <I;, purchased the subject vehicle from one whom those same 
,., "r ,!::; reflected as the owner. Defendant did so without 
,nstructive or actual knowledge of Plaintiff's security interest. 
c cend<lnt is, therefore, protected under Louisiana law as an 
::-;nocent purchaser for value and his interest in the subject 
"eh1cle is superior to the interest of Plaintiff. Ballard v. 
supra; Tarver v. Tarver, supra. 
C AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE FACTS OF THIS CASE SUPPORT THE 
APPLICATION OF UTAH LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF PRIORITY. 
In the alternative to the application of Louisiana 
i.dw, the record indicates that Utah has a significant interest in 
.1aving its law determine the priorities between the parties. The 
policy considerations offer guidance in reaching 
Lhis conclusion. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
fi(2)(1971). 
1. The needs of interstate and international 
The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in Utah, Utah Code 
Ann. §§70A-l-101 et provides a uniform law to meet the needs 
,·f commercial and secured transactions which intersect many states 
mobile society. The Code's application in the present case 
further these needs. 
The relevant policies of the forum. Expanding 
-,, c-anzc of the Code's application would promote commercial 
'.":erdction within Utah by furthering the justified expectation 
'1,it this universally adopted law will be applied. Furthermore, 
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the Defendant is a Utah resident which invokes this state's policy 
in protecting the bona fide interests of its residents. Finally, 
since the subject automobile is in the custody of the Salt Lake 
County Constable, the policies of this state dictate that Utah law 
govern questions which affect this property. 
3. The relevant policies of other interested states 
and the relative interests of those states in the determination of 
the particular issue. Louisiana has an interest in protecting the 
interests of its resident creditors. However, Louisiana has no 
interest where the resident creditor did not comply with the 
system set in place by the state to protect them; the transaction 
took place outside the state with a nonresident purchaser; the 
subject property is now located outside the state; and the 
creditor knew or should have known the subject vehicle was 
primarily used outside the state. 
4. The protection of justified expectations. 
Defendant, a resident of Utah, a Code state, purchasing the 
subject vehicle i.n Oklahoma, a Code state, from a person whom 
Defendant considered a resident of Texas, also a Code state, could 
justifiably expect the U.C.C. to be the governing law. In 
addition, Plaintiff knew that Louisiana has not adopted Article 9 
of the U.C.C. and it knew or should have known the subject Ferrari 
was primarily located in Texas. Plaintiff could, therefore. 
justifiably expect that the U.C.C. would be applied in some 
manner. 
S. The basic policies underlving the particular 
field of law. The U.C.C.'s underlying purposes and policies are 
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.. ,,, "unp l if y, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
1nsactions; to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
"'ti, <"S through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
'd 1 ro make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." 
, r 1 h Code Ann. §70A-l-102(2) (a)-(c) (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
onlicies will be furthered by the application of Utah law. 
These 
6. Certainty, predictability and uniformity of 
result. Because the U.C.C. has been universally embraced by the 
various jurisdictions, the Code's application will promote 
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result concerning the 
issue of priority. 
Utah law thus has a significant interest in having 
its law applied with respect to the issue of priority. Therefore, 
the transaction "bears an appropriate relationship to this state" 
justifying the application of Utah law. Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-l-105; Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 
1131 (Utah 1982). See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R. 3d 341 (1975). 
Utah law, as applied to the present case, grants 
lefendant's interest in the subject automobile priority over 
Plaintiff's unperfected security interest. The discussion of 
".e,-:as law supra at 19 is applicable. In particular, Plaintiff's 
''''perfected security interest is subordinated to the rights of 
erenc!ant by virtue of Utah Code Ann. §9-301(1) (c) (Repl. Vol. 
,''90). See Victorv National Bank of Nowata v. Stewart, supra, 636 
',1 i88; McKenzie v. Oliver, supra, 571 S.W.2d 102. 
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II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT CONVERTED THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE 
Assuming, as did the trial court, that Utah law ;, 
applicable to the issue of conversion, and viewing the facts ar 
al 1 reasonable inferences therefrom in a 1 igh t most favorable :. 
Defendant, the District Court erred in holding as a matter of 
that Defendant converted the subject Ferrari. Hall v, Warren, 63: 
P.2d, 848 (Utah 1981), 
Under Utah law, conversion is an act of willful: 
interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification 
which deprives the person entitled to the chattel of its use and 
possession. Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958); 
Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peav, 558 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1977). See 
generally Prosser, Law of Torts, Ch. 3, §15 (4th ed. 1971). An 
action for conversion also requires that the Plaintiff be entitlec 
to the immediate possession of the property at the time of the 
alleged conversion. Johnson v. Flowers, ll9 Utah 425, 228 P.2c 
406 (1951); Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P.2d 365 (1951). 
With respect to secured transactions, this Court has 
recognized the prinicple that: 
One who has an immediate right to possession, such as a 
chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after default, 
may maintain an action for conversion against one who 
has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the 
property of another in exclusion or denial of his rights 
or inconsistent therewith. 
Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1071). 
In affirming the trial co11rt 's _judgment, the court 
Murdock relied on the proposition that, upon default, §9-503 or 
the Utah t.:niform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. )IOA-1-101 
- ::: 9 -
··ii .1980), as well as the security agreement, grants to the 
·Lred p'l.rty an immediate right to possess the chattel thereby 
in<' rise to a cause of action for conversion as against a 
1·r1•" n t 1 evying creditor. Murdock v. Blake, supra, 484 p. 2d at 
DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OF POSSESSION 
OVER THE SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
In the case at bar, the District Court, on the basis 
,_,f :·lurdock v. Blake, supra, held that since Amann was in default 
•r ::he loan with Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had an immediate right 
:_u possession of the collateral under §9-503. Therefore, "anyone 
·,;ho took or kept possession after default converted the vehicle." 
See Murdock v. Blake, supra, 484 P. 2d at 169. The 
Cour:: further held that even if Defendant were a bfp, 
Allred v. Hinkley, supra, prevents him from obtaining good title 
co the subject vehicle from a converter of the goods. id. at 728. 
IR A necessary implication in the Court's holding is that 
upon default, had converted the Ferrari. 
Defendant respectfully submits that since Plaintiff 
was unperfected at the time of Defendant's purchase and Defendant 
· .. ;;.i, a bfp (see supra at 8, 19, 21), Murdock and Allred are 
as to the issue of conversion. 
Murdock should be applied only where the debtor is in 
,, under the security agreement and the secured creditor has 
·ir,1perly perfected security interest which is superior to that 
·he purchaser. This was the case in Murdock where the secured 
cl'•''· ,itlantic Richfield, had a perfected security interest, 
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and the debtor, Blake, was in default under the securit" 
agreement. Furthermore, Murdock, a subsequent levying creditor, 
had an 
rights 
interest 
of a 
in the collateral which was subordinate to th 
perfected security interest c.f.Utah Cocf 
Ann. § § 9- 301 ( 1) ( b) , ( 3) ; 9-312(5) (a). The court in Murdoc, 
correctly held that Murdock converted the collateral. 
The cases cited in Murdock support this proposition. 
In both Platte Valley Bank of North Bend v. Krael, 185 Neb. 168, 
174 N.W.2d 72 (1970) and William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, 
Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 659 (1967) the securec 
creditors held perfected security interests which were superior to 
that of the intervening levying creditor. 
In First National Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 9; 
N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1966), also cited in Murdock, the 
Plaintiff secured creditor had a security interest in 
automobile which was properly perfected in New York. The debtor 
then removed the vehicle to New Jersey where he sold it to 
Defendant Sharp within four months thereafter. In holding that 
the purchaser was liable for conversion, the court found that oo 
the basis of N.J. Stat.Ann. §l2A:l-103(3) (West 1962) (now 
§12A:9-103(2) (b) (West Supp. 1983)) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, the security interest properly perfected in New Yotl, 
continued to be perfected in New Jersey for a period of four 
months. 
,., 
First National Bank of Ba.v Shore v. Stamper, supra, "-" 
A. 2d at 168-169. Since Sharp purchased the automobile within the 
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1r-month period, the court thus held him liable for conversion. 
,1 r- 169. 
However, the Stamper court pointed out that: 
lf the [secured creditor] fails to file within the 
f,,ur-month period, the protection of his security 
interest ceases upon the expiration thereof, and his 
imperfected security interest is thereafter subject to 
he defeat7d under the Code. A subsequent purchaser for 
value, without notice of the un rotected securit 
interest, wou ta e a superior tit e. .J. 
12A:9-301, 9-307,1-20l(a), N.J.S.A. (Emphasis added.) 
?irst National Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, supra, 225 A.2d at 
This reasoning is echoed in First National Bank of Highland 
v. Merchant's Mutual Insurance Company, 89 Misc. 2d 771, 392 
'lY. S . 2 d 8 3 6 (19 77 ) a ff ' d 6 5 A. D . 2 d 5 9 , 410 N. Y. S . 2 d 6 7 9 (19 7 8) , 
<.·1herein it is stated that "in order to establish a cause of action 
'.or conversion, a Plaintiff must show: (1) legal ownership or an 
immediate superior right to possession, and (2) the exercise by 
Jefendant of unauthorized acts of dominion over the [collateral] 
in question, to the exclusion of Plaintiff's rights." id. 392 
:; . 'i. S. 2 d at 8 3 6 (Emphasis added.) See also Chemical Bank v. -- ---
:11ller Yacht Sales, 173 N.J. Super.90, 413 A.2d 619, 623 (1980) 
1and cases cited therein); Walker v. Security Loan Inv. Co., 259 
j,W, 2d 599, 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). 
The key to the issue at hand is whether Plaintiff had 
an immcd ia te superior right to possess ion of the subject Ferrari. 
11ming that Plaintiff had an immediate right to possession upon 
··.n's default, which Defendant denies he had (see infra at 34), 
icies not have a superior right as against a third party where 
security interest was unperfected at the time of 
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Defendant's purchase, and Defendant is a bfp. 
Code Ann. §70A-9-30l(l)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
(See supra) Utar. 
Indeed, were it 
held otherwise, it would be a mockery of the perfection and 
priority provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and would 
render them sterile where the debtor is in default. Certainly the 
draftsmen of the Code did not intend to engage in such a futile 
exercise. 
With respect to the significance of Defendant as a bfp, the 
above reasoning applies to the District Court's reliance on Allred 
v. Hinkley, supra, 328 P. 2d 726, wherein it is stated: "Thus a 
bona fide purchaser of the goods for value from one who has no 
right to sell them becomes a converter when he takes possession of 
such goods." id. at 728. The District Court felt that, upon 
default, anyone, including the debtor Amann, who retained 
possession converted the subject vehicle (R.241). This completely 
ignores the Code's provision allowing the debtor to transfer his 
rights in the collateral notwithstanding a provision in the 
security agreement prohibiting any transfer. Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-9-311 (Repl. Vol. 1980). In addition to rendering the 
perfection and priority provisions of the Code useless, the 
District Court's holding places an unreasonable restraint on the 
alienation of property which, in today's society, would unduly 
chill comme,cial transactions. 
Murdock v. Blake, supra, is not to the contrary. In 
harmonizing §9-311 with §9-503, Murdock granted that the 
collateral may be sold, but it is done so subject to a securit. 
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crerest which is superior to that of the levying creditor. 
'!urclock, 484 P.2d at 169. 
Therefore, the Plaintiff being unperfected at the 
uf Defendant's purchase and Defendant being a bfp, Defendant 
a superior right to possess the subject vehicle. First 
;;icion0l Bank of Highland v. Merchant's Mutual Insurance Co., 
Code Ann. §70A-9-30l(l)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1980). Thus, 
Defendant did not exercise unauthorized acts of dominion over the 
Ferrari. Murdock v. Blake, supra. 
B. PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF THE 
SUBJECT AUTOMOBILE. 
In addition, Defendant did not convert the Ferrari 
because Plaintiff did not have an immediate right to its 
oossession. 
As noted above, this Court stated in Murdock v. 
Blake, supra, 484 P.2d 164, that upon default, §9--503 of the Utah 
Cniform Cornrnercial Code, as well as the default provisions in the 
securitv agreement, gives a secured party the irnrnediate right to 
oossess the collateral. This gives rise to an action for 
cunversion. 484 P.2d at 169. The District Court felt that, since 
Amann was in default under the security agreement at the time of 
)efendant' s purchase, Plaintiff had an immediate right to 
possession of the subject automobile. (R. 240-241.) The District 
':,rnrt also implicitly relied upon the construction given §9-503 by 
citation to Murdock v. Blake, supra. 
Louisiana law conrols the determination of the immediate ri ht 
co possession as etween t e parties to t e security agreement. 
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A court should first follow a statutory directive of 
its own state. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §6(1! 
(1971). The issues on appeal revolve around a security interesr 
created by a chattel mortgage. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
is, therefore, the controlling forum statute. Utah Code Ann 
§70A-9-102(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980). The Code's general choice of 
provision states that, absent agreement otherwise, it "applies to 
transact ions bearing an appropriate relation to this state." Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-l-105(1) (Repl. Vol. 1980). Perfection not being 
germane to the rights of the parties to the security agreement, 
§§1-105(2) and 9-103 of the Code are irrelevant to the issue at 
hartd. 
In determining whether the transaction between 
Plaintiff and Amann bears an "appropriate relation" to this state, 
the Code's official comment is instructive. The comment provides, 
in part, that : 
Cases where a relation to the enacting state is not 
"appropriate" include, for example, those where the 
parties have clearly contracted on the basis of some 
other law, as where the law of the place of contracting 
and the law of the place of contemplated performance 
are the same and are contrary to the law under the 
Code. 
Uniform Commercial Code, Official Com. 2, lU.L. A. 35 (1976). 
Clearly Plaintiff and Amann contracted with reference to Louisiana 
law: the chattel mortgage agreement continually refers to 
Louisiana law (R. 84-87, 172-173); Plaintiff's principal place or 
business is in Louisiana; and the contract was executed ir 
Louisiana. Furthermore, since the obligation secured by the 
chattel mortgage was to be paid at New Orleans, Louisiana, t 'le 
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,,: , y ,,[ performance is also in Louisiana. Walker Bank & Trust 
Walker, 631 P.2d 860 (Utah 1981.) 
The Restatement's position is that the validity and 
, , N'I , ci11d enforcement and redemption of a security interest is 
Li by the law of the state which has the most significant 
ions hip to the parties; greater weight being given to the 
location of the chattel when the security interest attached than 
anv other contact. 
§§251, 254 (1971). 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
Louisiana has the most significant 
relationship with respect to the rights of the parties to the 
security agreement. It cannot be said that Utah has any interest 
in having its law applied where, as in the present case, a chattel 
mortgage is executed in Louisiana between a Louisiana bank and a 
non-Utah resident, and where the collateral was presumably located 
in Louisiana at the time of execution. 
Louisiana law, as the governing law, is further 
supported by prior decisions of this Court. It has long been the 
rule of Utah that the law of lex loci contractus controls the 
'Jalidity, interpretation and effect of the contract. Crofoot v. 
Thatcher, 19 Utah 212, 57 P. 171 (1899); Blyth and Fargo v. Huntz, 
:;, Utah 62, 66 P. 611 (1901); American Leather Co. v. Standard Gig 
Saddle Co., 9 Utah 87, 33 P. 246 (1893). This principle was 
:ecently reaffirmed in Morris v. Sykes, 624 P. 2d 681 (Utah 1981). 
Therefore, as a matter of choice of law, Utah law 
"uinls to the application of Louisiana law with respect to the 
i.ghts of the parties to the security agreement. Thus, Louisiana 
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law governs Plaintiff's right, as secured creditor, to the 
ilillTlediate possession of the subject Ferrari upon default. 
2. Louisiana law does not ive a secured creditor an immediate 
right to possession o t e co atera upon e au t y t e e tor:-
In addition to its reliance on Utah Code Ann 
§70A-9-503 (Repl. Vol. 1980), the District Court also found that 
"the security agreement provides that the Plaintiff has the right 
to cause the mortgaged vehicle to be seized and sold if Amann 
[were in default]." (R.238) The more complete default provision 
reads "if Borrower [Amann J • .defaults. . under this contract, 
Holder [Plaintiff) may cause the mortgaged vehicle to be seized 
and sold under executory or any other legal process, in the manner 
provided law, . (Emphasis added.) (R. 86, 173.) Unlike 
§9-503 of the Code which gives the secured creditor an immediate 
right to possession upon default through extrajudicial 
foreclosure, c. f. Murdock v. Blake, supra, Louisiana provides no 
comparable remedies. Under Louisiana law, a chattel mortgagee 
must foreclose its mortgage in the ordinary judicial manner, or ex 
parte before a judicial officer via executory process. 
Louisiana's Chattel Mortgage Act extends all remedies 
and processes available to creditors under mortgages affecting 
ilillTloveables to those creditors of obligations secured by mortgages 
affecting moveables, 
specifically granted. 
the right of executory process being 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:5363 (West Supp. 
1982). The method of executing and recording mortgages 
vehicles covered by a certificate of title is excepted from the 
Chattel Mortgage Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:5366 (West 1950), and 
is exclusively governed by the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, 
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PJ''J. State. Ann. § §32: 701 et (West 1963). The remedies 
i:•G methods available to enforce mortgages on motor vehicles are 
"·ii l governed, however, by §9:5363 of the Chattel Mortgage Act. 
J .• 1_ Rev. Stat. Ann. §32:710K (West 1963); General Motors 
._,,,•pt.rnce Corporation v. Anzelino, 220 La. 1019, 64 So.2d 417 
I I ·1)]) . 
Since executory process is the method, because of its 
summary nature, by which most Louisiana creditors reach their 
security, it will be briefly discussed below. Indeed, the chattel 
between Plaintiff and Amann anticipates its use by 
providing for a Confession of Judgment, Waiver of Notice of Demand 
and Authorization for Use of Executory Process. 
!72-173.) 
(R.84-87, 
control. 
La. Code Civ. Proc. art's. 2631 et (West 1960) 
Article 2631 defines executory proceedings as those 
effecting seizure and sale of property, without previous judgment, 
to enforce a mortgage evidenced by an authentic act importing a 
-:onfession of judgment. See Cameron Brown South, Inc. , v. East 
Glen Oaks, Inc., 341 So.2d 450 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir 1976). 
Article 2634 provides that a filing of a petition is a mandatory 
prerequisite to an executory proceeding. See Chrysler Credit 
\orp. v. Stout, 404 So.2d 304 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Myer v. 
647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981) (Applying Louisiana law). 
Authentic evidence to prove the right to use executory process is 
Hso required to be submitted with the petition. Articles 2635, 
c6Jb. Finally, if the mortgagee has met the prerequisites, the 
::2_'Ht then shall order a writ of seizure and sale. Article 2638. 
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See generally Comment, Executorv and Special 
Executory Process, Attachment and Sequestration, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 
190 (1975-76). 
Louisiana courts have taken the posture that 
executory process is a harsh remedy and requires strict compliance 
with its procedure and sufficient authentic proof to support every 
link in the chain of evidence. See Myrtle Grove Packing Co. 
v. Mones, 226 La. 287, 76 So.2d 305 (1955); American Security Bank 
v. Delville, 368 So.2d 167 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 1979); American 
Budget Plan, Inc. v. Small, 229 So.2d 190 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 
1969). 
It is clear that, unlike the majority of 
jurisdictions adopting Article 9 of the Uniform Col!llllercial Code, 
Louisiana's policy is to not subject debtors to extrajudicial, 
self-help repossesion, and to provide a sul!llllary determination of 
the rights of the parties before collateral may be repossessed. 
Hood Motor Co., Inc. v. Lawrence, 320 So.2d 111 (La. 1975). 
Thus, the applicable Louisiana law does not, and did 
not, give Plaintiff an immediate right to possess the subject 
automobile upon default by Amann without resort to the 
appropriate, albeit summary, procedure. The record does not 
disclose that Plaintiff complied with the executory procedure or a 
foreclosure of the mortgage in the ordinary judicial manner. 
Since Plaintiff had no i=ediate right to possession, the District 
Court erred, as a matter of law, in holding Defendant liable for 
conversion. Johnson v. Flowers, supra; Murdock v. Blake, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully 
, cque s ts this Court to reverse the judgment of the trial court as 
, rt er of law or, in the alternative, remand the case for a 
rial on the genuine issues of material fact existing in the 
record. 
DATED this /JI day of , 1983. 
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